As technology develops, it is only a matter of time before agents will be capable of long term autonomy, i.e., will need to choose their actions by themselves for a long period of time. Thus, in many cases agents will not be able to be coordinated in advance with all other agents with which they may interact. Instead, agents will need to cooperate in order to accomplish unanticipated joint goals without pre-coordination. As a result, the "ad hoc teamwork" problem, in which teammates must work together to obtain a common goal without any prior agreement regarding how to do so, has emerged as a recent area of study in the AI literature. However, to date, no attention has been dedicated to the social aspect of the agents' behavior, which is required to ensure that their actions' influences on other agents conform with social norms. In this research, we introduce the STAR framework used to teach agents to act in accordance with human social norms with respect to their teammates. Using a hybrid team (agents and people), if taking an action considered to be socially unacceptable, the agents will receive negative feedback from the human teammate(s). We view STAR as an initial step towards achieving the goal of teaching agents to act more consistently with respect to human morality.
Introduction
As autonomous agents become capable of an increasing variety of tasks, it will become impossible for them to be coordinated in advance with all other agents with which they may interact. Rather, they will need to communicate and cooperate in order to achieve unanticipated joint goals without pre-coordination. People do so effortlessly, for example during ordinary events such as pickup soccer games. Agents (as well as people) may need to do so in more crucial scenarios such as an earthquake rescue mission. As a result, a recent line of work in the AI literature has studied the "ad hoc teamwork" problem, in which a team of agents is formed ad hoc, for a particular purpose, and the team strategies cannot be developed a priori [26, 24, 12, 11] . However, to date, no attention has been dedicated to examining whether the methods proposed are safe in the sense of preventing the agents from choosing socially unacceptable actions in order to complete their task. When working together, agents' actions have mutual influence on one another. Since agents will be performing autonomously in real world social (multiagent) scenarios, it is important that they know how to act in a way that will not be at odds with other teammates. As a result, this work addresses the social aspect of ad hoc teamwork by enabling an agent to explicitly model a human trainer's notion of "good" and "bad" outcomes.
The premise of ad hoc teamwork is the existence of long term autonomy, i.e., an agent being able to (indeed needing to) choose its actions and tasks by itself for a long period of time. Due to social norms being a notoriously difficult concept to represent algorithmically, we are interested in enabling the agent to learn, from experience, what is considered to be a socially good (i.e., permissible) or bad (i.e., unacceptable) behavior using the interactions it has with the people around it. In this paper we study the case of a hybrid team including agents and people. During the cooperation, if taking an action considered to be unacceptable (as opposed to ineffective), the agents will receive negative feedback on a dedicated channel for this purpose from the human teammate(s). Our method builds upon past work introducing the TAMER framework for learning from positive and negative human feedback [23] . TAMER is based on the assumption that feedback is given to teach the agent how to be more effective. Our work differs by introducing a separate channel by which a person can indicate actions that are unacceptable even when they are effective. Using this social feedback during the learning process, agents are able to develop a set of internal rules such that given a task they will be able to solve it compatibly with the humans' concept of social norms. This paper makes two main contributions. First, it introduces a novel framework used to teach autonomous agents working together the concept of humans' social norms during the performance of tasks. The paper describes four possible designs of the framework differing in the way agents receive feedback. Second, using the setting of a multiagent Tetris game, the paper tests all four designs, showing that the best design, i.e., the one that helps the agent to learn what is socially acceptable the fastest while not causing too much damage to the effectiveness of its actions, is the parallel combined feedback in which the agent receives both social and effectiveness feedback on parallel channels.
Finally, we note that by applying the suggested framework on ad hoc teams, we are constraining agents to execute behaviors which are compatible with human norms. We view this framework as a first step towards creating a safe AI-enabled environment in which agents' actions are compatible with human morality. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In the next section we review the existing relevant literature in the field of ad hoc teamwork and the value alignment problems. We then move on to some preliminaries and a formal description of the STAR framework. Next, we provide an experimental evaluation of the STAR framework using a version of the classic Tetris game and conclude with a discussion and future work.
Related Work
Multiagent teamwork is a well-studied topic, with most work tackling the problem of creating standards for coordination and communication. Many algorithms have been proposed in order to assist agents to better cooperate (e.g., [34, 18, 35] ). While these algorithms have been shown to be effective, they require that teammates share a coordination framework. However, as autonomous agents are becoming more generally intelligent the basic assumption that each interaction can be pre-coordinated and planned is becoming no longer valid. Instead, agents will need to be prepared to communicate and cooperate without preparation in advance. This capability can be used in a variety of different settings, ranging from rescue missions to unplanned group games or social interactions. The case in which agents need to cooperate in order to achieve a joint goal, not being able to plan their strategies in advance, is called the "ad hoc teamwork" problem [32] .
The design of autonomous agents that can be a part of an ad hoc team is an important open problem in multiagent systems and as such has been widely studied [12, 11, 37, 13, 26] . Several works addressed this problem by proposing methods which utilize beliefs over a set of hypothetical behaviors for the other agents [3, 5, 9, 10, 14, 31] . Behaviors in this approach are specified as types, which are black-box mappings from interaction histories to probability distributions over actions. If the types are sufficiently representative of the true behaviors of other agents, then this method can lead to rapid adaptation and effective interaction in the absence of explicit prior coordination [9, 4, 2] .
One crucial issue that was left out of scope in the above-mentioned work and is yet to be studied is the question of how social the agents' actions are on their way to the goal. This issue is particularly important due to the fact that we are heading toward a future in which agents will be capable of long-term autonomy without direct supervision of humans. One example of its importance is the scenario in which agents, as part of their daily tasks, will need to wait in line. In this case, knowing the social norms within the community with regards to queuing behaviors could strongly influence, for example, whether the agent should crowd to the front or wait patiently in line. In this paper we aim to address this concern by providing a tool which will allow an agent to develop an internal set of social rules it should follow, at the same time as learning how to perform a given task.
One relevant line of research considers the general problem of reinforcement learning from preferences rather than absolute reward values [17, 1, 36] . Specifically, the work of Christiano et al. [15] uses human feedback regarding their preferences in order to improve sophisticated reinforcement learning systems' interaction with real-world environments. By comparing pairs of trajectory segments they can effectively solve complex reinforcement learning tasks without access to the reward function while providing feedback on less than 1% of the agent's interactions with the environment. In our work however, we do not aim to learn the human preferences or to use them as a means for improving the learning process. Instead, we aim to learn a set of social norms which, given a team and their individual preferences, defines how the agent is allowed to act.
One very relevant work to ours is the work of Alshiekh et al. [6] . In their work they are trying to ensure safety during learning or execution phases of a policy learned using reinforcement learning algorithms. Their notion of safety, however, is different from ours. This difference is reflected in two aspects. First, as opposed to our case, in which social norms can be taught only directly through human instructors, the safety they are referring to can be specified using temporal logic and thus there is no real advantage to the use in human feedback. Second, in their work, an action is considered to be safe only if it does not lead to an undesired state whereas, in our work, an action can lead to a positive state (e.g., owning a million dollars) and still be unacceptable (e.g., stealing). The work of Balakrishnan et al. [8] studies the problem of applying dynamic ethics rules on content recommendation systems. By using a movie recommendation system, they test their machine-learning-based method, showing that it helps to balance between the ethical principles of the parents and the child's preferences. Their work includes an off-line first stage in which they provide the learning algorithm a set of labeled examples. We, however, are using on-line feedback provided to the agent during the performance of the task such that no off-line preparation is needed. Additionally, their system tries to balance between the ethics constraints and the user preferences such that in some cases one comes at the expense of the other. In our case, however, our demand is strict and an agent cannot choose a unacceptable action even if it is more effective than the permissible one.
Finally, our proposed research can be seen as merging research on ad hoc teamwork with research on the "Value Alignment problem". The idea behind the value alignment principle, as popularized by Russell [30] , is that highly autonomous AI systems should be designed so that their goals and behaviors can be assured to align with human values throughout their operation. Our research is predicated on the belief that developing a method to teach those agents the concept of human social norms is an important step toward reaching this goal. We note, that most existing approaches to the value alignment problem assume that misalignment comes from an error in goal specification, inadequate constraints on actions, or lack of human knowledge [20, 21, 19, 16, 27] . We, however, assume the goal specification from the human to be precise and add an additional layer of social norms to the agent's learned behavior. We hypothesize that this new approach will improve agent performance and will help to create safe future interaction with robots.
Preliminaries
Our framework is an extension of the human-feedback-based reinforcement learning framework, TAMER [23] , which models the learning task as a Markov Decision Process. the following subsections provide a formal description of Markov Decision Process and of the original TAMER framework.
Markov Decision Process
As in many decision-making problems, our problem can be represented as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). In MDP problems, an agent has a set of possible states de-noted by S. Additionally, the agent has a set of actions A from which it can choose an action at every time step. Given a state and an action, the probability of transitioning to another state on the next time step is denoted by the transition function T , T : S × A × S → R. A discount factor, γ, can be used in order to exponentially decreases the value of a future reward. We use D in order to denote the distribution of start states. Finally, a reward function R, R : S × A × S → R, provides the reward received by the agent based on the most recent state, the most recent action, and the next state s t , a t , and s t+1 . Formally, an MDP can be represented by the tuple (S, A, T , γ, D, R).
Many reinforcement learning algorithms [33] seek to learn MDP policies (π : S → A) that maximize return from each state-action pair, where
. MDP reward is considered flawless since the policies determined by it are optimal (i.e., for each state, choose the action with the highest possible return). However, in many tasks (e.g., chess) the received reward signal is both "sparse" and "delayed". This is because in many of those tasks, state-action pairs that do not lead to a termination of the task receive zero reward. Thus, the agent must wait until the end of the episode to receive any information from the environment that helps it determine the quality of each state-action pair.
The TAMER Framework
Formally, the TAMER Framework is an approach to the Shaping Problem, which is: given a human trainer observing an agent's behavior and delivering evaluative reinforcement signals, how should the agent be designed to make it leverage the human reinforcement signals to learn good behavior? [23] .
Using the TAMER framework one can replace the sparse and delayed MDP reward signal with a human reward signal. As opposed to MDP reward signal, when a human trainer observes an agent's behavior, he has a model of the long-term effect of that behavior. Thus, human feedback contains information about whether the targeted behavior is good or bad in the long term. Additionally, since both the time it takes the human trainer to evaluate the targeted behavior and the time it takes to manually deliver the evaluation within a reinforcement signal are relatively small in most cases, human reinforcement is not sparse and is only trivially delayed. On the other hand, due to the fact that humans can get bored very easily, and have bounded rationality [22, 7, 28] , their evaluations tend to be imperfect (flawed). Overall, even though the human reward signal is not considered to be "flawless" as the MDP reward signal, the fact that the signals provided by humans are not sparse and delayed enables it to learn good behaviors more efficiently [23] .
Teaching social behavior for Ad hoc Teamwork
Even though the field of ad hoc teamwork has been studied deeply in the last decade, to date, no attention has been dedicated to examining methods for constraining agents under this paradigm to act in a way that is aligned with common human sensibilities, i.e., making sure that they will prevent the agents from choosing socially wrong actions.
As was mentioned above, in many cases, ad hoc teamwork agents may need to make decisions that have real effects on peoples' future (probability of survival, financial outcomes, and others).
We note that the concept of social norms is a notoriously difficult capability to represent algorithmically. We, therefore, propose that it ought to be taught directly by instructors. Fortunately, since our objective is to align an agent with subjective human social norms (i.e., we do not rely on there being absolute, universal acceptable norms), humans themselves have the domain knowledge that could speed the learning process, reducing costly sample complexity.
In this paper, we address the problem of controlling the agent's social behavior using the framework of ad hoc teamwork and a novel variant of the TAMER framework, which we introduce in the following section.
The STAR Framework In this section we introduce a novel algorithm based on the TAMER framework called "Socially Training Agents via Reinforcement" (STAR). Like TAMER, STAR also uses human feedback but does not limit it only to the effectiveness aspect of the action performed. STAR has an additional channel by which a person can indicate actions that are unacceptable even when they are technically effective. Based on both the effectiveness signal and the social signal, agents will need to find ways to solve the problem that do not violate the social norms constraints. As a result, agents will now be able to create a form of "inner conscience" helping them to solve a given problem compatibly with the humans' concept of social norms. Figure 1 shows the interaction between a human, the environment, and a STAR agent within an MDP. In the figure, the human constructs a state s from the environment's display. In addition we assume that the human has both the effectiveness function (i.e., H e : S × A → R) and the social function (i.e., H s : S × A → {0, 1}) as internal functions so that given a state s, and an action a that the agent has taken, the human is able to provide feedback to the agent that is consistent with them. The agent learns models of these two functions. Using the models, the agent's "effective-action selector" chooses an action which is then sent to the "social filter". If it passes the filter, in addition to it being performed, the action is also sent to the supervised learner along with the current state as an input. The supervised learner then refines the agent's models based on the information that this action is the most effective action among the permissible actions. Otherwise, the agent chooses a new (predicted to be less effective) action until it finds one that passes the social filter.
Finally, we note, that in STAR as in TAMER the learning is treated as a supervised learning problem, and does not require value propagation. This is due to the premise that humans provide feedback on the long-term effects of an action -the return, rather than the reward.
Assumptions
We now present the basic assumptions being made both regarding the nature of the two functions the agent is attempting to learn and regarding the team's social norms.
• Functions' Nature -We assume that the effectiveness function, H e , is a scalar function, i.e., for each state-action pair, (s, a), given as an input, the function will produce a number representing the effectiveness (value) of taking action a in a state s. The social function, H s , in contrast, is a binary function which given a state and action, (s, a), returns 1 if taking action a in state s is considered to be permissible and 0 otherwise. While this assumption is admittedly a simplification, we make it in this initial instantiation of STAR so as to avoid the necessity of multi objective optimization. However there is ample research on that topic [25, 29] that can be brought to bear when relaxing this assumption in future work. Additionally we assume that the boundary between the set of permissible actions and the set of unacceptable ones is clear, i.e., given a state, every action is either permissible or unacceptable. Formally: ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A, H s (s, a) ∈ {0, 1}
The rightmost part of Figure 2 illustrates those two assumptions. In the figure, every cross represents a state-action pair (where for all pairs the state is the current state) and the number under each pair represents the action's predicted effectiveness. The actions on the left are considered to be unacceptable while the actions on the right are considered to be permissible. Finally, we assume that for each possible state there exists at least one applicable permissible action, i.e., ∀s ∈ S, ∃a ∈ A s.t. H s (s, a) = 1
• Team's Social Norms -We further assume that social norms are specific to each team of humans. That is, rather than being an absolute, global concept, it is relative to the team on which the agent is participating. However, we do assume that each team has a consistent view of social norms its members. 1 In addition, we note, that the agent's only purpose is to learn the team's social function, and hence it does not judge the team's choices regarding what they consider to be permissible. Finally, we assume that if it is able to properly learn the team's social function, the agent will always choose a permissible action, i.e., the only cause of an agent choosing a unacceptable action is its lack of ability to properly learn the team's social function.
Experimental Evaluation
STAR is designed for situations in which a team of agents is working together towards a cooperative goal, while at the same time each maintains individual preferences. For example, a construction crew may have the cooperative goal of building a house, with each person preferring different types of houses (floor plans, decors, etc.), and each preferring not to do more than his or her share of the work. To represent such tasks in an easily controllable experimental setting, we introduce a new domain, Multiagent Tetris (MaT), with the following essential properties: (i) a team of agents works together towards the joint goal of clearing as many rows as possible as a team; (ii) each agent has individual preferences for intermediate states along the way towards goal states; (iii) a variety of social codes can be defined indicating the team's joint attitude towards how much each other's preferences ought to be taken into account when selecting actions (these codes can range from considering only one's own preferences, to making sure never to violate any teammate's preferences); (v) when provided with the details of the joint goal, the different agents' preferences, and the particular instantiation of team social norms, a person can provide feedback to the agent both on the effectiveness of any given action towards the joint goal and whether the action is consistent with the team's social code. Our experimental evaluation protocol is illustrated in Figure 2 .
In the following subsections, we provide a detailed description of the MaT domain and indicate how each of these properties is met. In Section 6, we evaluate STAR as well as several ablations that mask various aspects of the user's feedback signal.
The MaT Domain
We use Tetris as the basis for our experimental domain due to the fact that it has already been shown that TAMER performs well in it [23] . In MaT, a number of agents take turns playing in the same game. They use round-robin scheduling such that in each agent's time slice that agent is the only one playing. We define an agent's time slice to be the amount of time in which the agent controls n blocks, where n ∈ N. The agent's slice ends when it puts down its last of the n blocks. As a result, an agent is able to control its blocks from beginning to end and is able to place them exactly where it intends to.
Additionally, blocks in MaT are of different colors (as elaborated below). The agents share the joint goal of clearing as many rows as possible, i.e., the score of each agent is a function of the overall number of rows cleared by the entire team. Since clearing a row requires a sequence of actions to be performed, the team has to collaborate in order to achieve this goal. Figure 3 depicts a screen shot of the MaT game. 
Agents' Preferences
As mentioned above, each agent has individual preferences for intermediate states along the way towards goal states. In practice this means that each agent is differently influenced by different adjacent pairs of colors placed on the board. Thus, in contrast to the score received from accomplishing the joint goal of clearing a row, which influences all agents in the same way, each intermediate state of the board has a different influence on each of the agents.
Social Code Instantiations
A team's social code indicates to what degree each agent should take into account its own and the other agents' preferences when selecting actions. For example, in one team, it may be considered permissible to always take the action which leads to the most rows being cleared, whereas in another team it may never be considered permissible to take an action that goes against another teammate's preferences. Using different social code instantiations in the MaT domain, assuming the effectiveness feedback stays the same, we can test the effect each instantiation has on performance.
To numerically represent each agent's affinity for an intermediate board state, we sum up the number of adjacent pairs this agent finds to be good and subtract the number of adjacent pairs he considers to be bad. Each adjacent pair which is strongly preferred by the agent is added twice to the overall sum, and those that are strongly disliked by the agent are subtracted twice from the overall sum. There may also be adjacent pairs that the agent is indifferent to, and naturally those will not influence its affinity for the board. For example, if one agent likes red next to blue, strongly dislike blue next to green, and is indifferent to all other combinations, its affinity for the board state in Figure 3 is −10 (since there are 6 pairs of red next to blue and 8 pairs of blue next to green that are being subtracted twice).
The following are different possible instantiations of the social code concept:
• Global -This definition only considers the influence an agent's action has over the whole team's resulting board affinity. Given an action a i performed by an agent, we will define ∆ ai to be the difference between the sum of all teammates' board affinities after performing a i and before performing it. Thus, given an action a i , it is considered to be unacceptable only if ∆ ai is negative. We note that according to this definition it does not matter if some of its teammates lost from the agent's action, as long as ∆ ai is positive, (i.e., the team as a whole has benefit from the action), this is a permissible action. This type of social code focuses on maximizing social welfare.
• Relative -This definition considers the effect an agent's action has on its teammates. Here an agent is allowed to cause damage (decrease in board affinity) to its teammate in only two cases: (i) the damage it caused is smaller than its own gain (i.e., it is permissible to sacrifice a small amount for a significant gain); (ii) the damage it caused is smaller than its own loss (i.e., it is only allowed to cause others to lose if your loss is bigger than theirs).
• Simple -Any action that causes any damage to any other agent is considered to be unacceptable.
• Permissive -All actions are considered to be permissible.
Finally, in the MaT domain, such as in many other domains, agents' actions have both short term and long term influences on their environment. If considering the short term influence, one should only care about the immediate influence of the agent's action on the other agents' board affinities. If considering the long term influence however, one needs to take into consideration both the influence the agent's action has on others in the current turn and in the next k ∈ N turns. However, in order to consider the long term influences an agent's action causes, one needs to calculate all possible board states (and their probabilities) in each of the next k turns. In this paper, we assume humans do not calculate all such possibilities when providing real-time social feedback; therefore we consider only the short term case in our evaluation.
Feedback Design
During execution, one or more human teammates are able to give feedback to the agents regarding the action most recently selected. Since we assume that all teammates share the same social norms, in all of our experiments, we include just a single human teammate giving advice to all the agents. This person is told both the rules of the game and which instantiation of social code to follow, and is instructed to provide separate feedback on an action's effectiveness and the degree to which it aligns with the social code. We implemented four STAR designs as illustrated in Figure 4 . In all cases, the human received the same instructions and the same interface for providing feedback, which included separate buttons to indicate whether an action is effective vs. permissible. However, we varied the information that the agents received as follows.
1. Single Feedback: Takes into account only the effectiveness/ permissibility of a given problem.
• Effectiveness Feedback -Takes into account only the effectiveness aspect of a given problem. Agents receive human feedback only regarding the effectiveness of their actions. This design is identical to the design of the original TAMER framework and is used as our baseline.
• Social Feedback -Takes into account only the social aspect of a given problem. Agents receive human feedback only regarding to how their actions in line with the social code. Hence, this design is used to check how an agent is able to learn the concept of human social norms with no other distractions. (Since the agent doesn't have any effectiveness feedback, it selects randomly from among the permissible actions.)
2. Combined Feedback: Takes into account both the effectiveness and the permissibility of a given problem.
• Blended Feedback -We eliminate the separation between effectiveness feedback and social feedback, creating an identity between the two. As a result, the agent receives positive feedback on the effectiveness channel both if the action is effective or permissible and a negative feedback if it is ineffective or unacceptable.
• Parallel Feedback -Takes into account both the effectiveness and the permissibility of a given problem. In this design, the human feedback comes from two separate parallel channels, each specifically designed for providing human feedback only regarding the effectiveness/social aspect of its actions. Parallel feedback is the paradigm used by the full STAR framework as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The feedback can then be used as input to the STAR framework as described in Section . By comparing the agent's learned behavior when using these different designs we will be able to characterize the influence each feedback channel has on the performance of the agents.
Results
Though in principle, MaT can be scaled up to include many agents, in all experiments reported in this paper we use a team composed of one human teammate and two agents. Additionally, we used three possible colors (red, green and blue) for the Tetris blocks. Figure 5 illustrates the different agents' preferences. Of the nine possible adjacent pairs of color blocks, both agents were indifferent towards adjacent pairs of blocks of the same color (i.e., red-red, green-green, and blue-blue). The first agent preferred redgreen, strongly preferred green-blue, and disliked red-blue. The second agent preferred green-blue, strongly preferred red-blue, and strongly disliked red-green. Both agents receive feedback from their human teammate. We evaluated the four instantiations of social codes described in Section , both with the full STAR system and with 3 ablations that remove or modify aspects of the feedback provided by the human teammate as described in Section . A game ends when the board is completely full, i.e., there is no more space for new blocks to enter. It has already been shown in previous work ( [23] ) that when receiving effectiveness feedback from a human, agents learn the effective policy rapidly. Thus, in our experiments, we measure the performance only until the tenth game. For the results to be comparable we eliminated randomness in block ordering and tested the different designs on an identical set of ten games. Additionally, for consistency in the human feedback, we created a human proxy that provides the feedback to the agents based on a pre-defined policy. Note that the policy used as the basis for the human proxy is suboptimal (as would be any real human's policy). In principle it should be possible to teach a more effective policy with an optimal proxy. However, since the main focus of our work is on the concept of permissibility, this suboptimality does not impact our results. Using the described setting, we hypothesized that the full STAR system that uses both social and effectiveness feedback leads to the best team performance within the constraints of the team's social code -that removing or altering feedback will lead to more forbidden actions being selected, less effective behavior, or both. For proving our hypothesis we tested two aspect of the learning, social learning and effectiveness learning.
• Social Learning -Testing all four designs for all four social code instantiations we found that if using the full STAR system no unacceptable actions were performed. This means that the agents learned very quickly using this design what is permissible and what is not. This is in contrast to when we used the blended feedback where about 25% of the performed actions were unacceptable. In the single effectiveness feedback design more then 30% of the actions chosen were unacceptable. The similarity between the percentages of unacceptable actions performed in the single effectiveness design (where the agents are not concerned at all from the social aspect of the actions) and the blended design, shows that the agents do not learn well when the feedback is provided without the proper context.
• Effectiveness Learning -As for effectiveness, as expected, the performance of the agents when receiving single effectiveness feedback exceeded all performance achieved using all other designs. The average number of rows agents were able to clear given this feedback design, which was identical for all social codes, 2 was 1118.6 rows per game. For all other designs, we calculated the average of the rows cleared over all four social codes in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the quality of each design without being influenced by the specific social code. When using the blended feedback design, the average number of rows cleared by the agents per game was 385.5. When using the parallel feedback design, the agents were able to clear 281.38 rows in average. Finally, when using the single morality feedback none of the rows were cleared.
Since if using the full STAR system no unacceptable actions are being performed it does make sense that the performance will be not as good as the ones achieved using the other designs that did allow the use of unacceptable actions. In order to make sure, however, that learning the humans' social function does not harm the effectiveness learning process we normalize the results achieved using the parallel design -divide each game's result by the result achieved in the best game out of the ten. Doing that, we test how well the agents learned the effectiveness function for each social code. Figure 6 shows that this depends on how restrictive the social code is. The figure depicts the normalized results for all 10 games when using the parallel feedback design. From the figure it can be observed that if using the simple, the relative or the permissive social codes, the agents do learn as the games progress. However, if using the global social code, which is much more restrictive, as it need to consider the implications of the agents' action on all other agents, we can not see clear evidence for learning. This is not surprising since as restrictiveness of the social code increases the number of permissible effective actions decreases. Thus, when using the global social code and the parallel feedback design in which, as shown before, no unacceptable action is performed, the learning process is greatly impaired.
These results support our hypothesis regarding the best feedback design and con-firm that our STAR framework leads to the best results under the permissibility constraints.
Discussion and Future Work
For the purpose of enabling society to control autonomous agents' social behavior and preventing them from acting in ways which are contrary to the good of society, we introduce the STAR framework. STAR addresses the social aspect of autonomous agents' behavior as part of a long-term autonomy process and enables agents to learn, from experience, what is considered to be a permissible or a unacceptable behavior using the interactions it has with the people around it. As opposed to TAMER which is based on the assumption that feedback is given to teach the agent how to be more effective, STAR introduces a separate channel by which a person can indicate actions that are unacceptable even when they are effective. Testing several designs for providing an agent with human feedback for several instantiations of social code, we confirmed our hypothesis that the best way to teach an agent how to be both social and effective is by using our STAR framework, i.e., using two parallel feedback channels, each devoted to providing only effectiveness/social feedback. Additionally, we were able to show that that if the social code is not too restrictive, the agent will be able to maintain the learning of the human effectiveness function without performing any unacceptable actions. There are many future research directions opened up by this research. Our ultimate goal is to teach agents the concept of human morality for creating a safe agent behavior. However, for this purpose some of the assumption made in this work will have to be relaxed. For example, one of the main assumptions in this research is the dichotomy property of H s , i.e., an action can be either permissible or unacceptable. However, when it comes to morality this is not the case due to the existence of a moral hierarchy. For instance, it is more immoral to kill someone than to steal a dollar. Thus, a natural next step is relaxing the dichotomy assumption and, using a multiobjective optimization, to explore a case in which an agent needs, in addition to learning what is considered to be permissible and what is not, to learn the full, complex concept of morality.
